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In ordinary critical practice, we take for granted that we can learn 
from fictions (literary or visual), i.e., that we can acquire new warranted 
beliefs on that basis.1 Thus, we assume that realist fictions include truths 
about the settings in which the fictional events occur, intended as such, 
and often backed by serious research. This makes understandable Salman 
Rushdie’s criticism of the film Slumdog Millionaire that it “piles impossibil-
ity on impossibility” [Guardian, 24/02/2009], given the realist ambitions 
of the film. We similarly assume that we can acquire experiential 
knowledge – knowledge of what it is like – and knowledge-how from fic-
tions, whether or not they differ from propositional knowledge. Even 
the most fantastic fictions invite readers to assume truths – say, about 
human psychology in Alice in Wonderland, to make sense of the behavior 
of the characters she meets and her interactions with them. But can this 
be philosophically justified? In the following introductory pages to this 
special issue of Teorema devoted to the topic, I’ll mention some strands 
of the most significant recent discussions that frame the papers to be 
found in it, and I’ll provide short summaries of these contributions. 
In his classical discussion of “truth in fiction” (i.e., of how fictional 
content is determined), Lewis (1978/83) envisaged two ways of learning 
from fiction. The first he derives from the role played by an assumption 
that has come to be known [after Walton (1990)] as the Reality Principle in 
going beyond what is explicitly presented in fictions in order to deter-
mine their content – a principle roughly to the effect that we can take to 
be “true in the fiction” what is true simpliciter, to the extent that it is con-
sistent with what is explicitly made part of the content of the fiction: 
“There may be an understanding between the author and his readers to 
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the effect that what is true in his fiction, on general questions if not on 
particulars, is not to depart from what he takes to be the truth”. Along 
similar lines, Gendler (2000), p. 76, has explained how principles allow-
ing the import of truths about the actual world to the content of fictions 
are a coin whose reverse side are corresponding export principles, allowing 
audiences in some cases (realist fiction genres, such as historical novels, 
biopics, etc.) to infer from fictional contents truths about the actual 
world. This suggests a possible mechanism accounting for how we can 
learn straightforward empirical truths from fictions, both about particu-
lar matters of fact and about universal truths.  
Gendler calls this inferential mechanism “narrative as clearinghouse: I ex-
port things from the story that you the story-teller have intentionally and 
consciously imported, adding them to my stock in the way that I add 
knowledge gained by testimony”. This supports complaints (such as Rush-
die’s regarding Slumdog Millionaire) about fictions that potentially mislead in 
so far as they allow audiences to infer falsehoods by invoking such export 
principles. Friend (2006) offers a good discussion of an excellent example, 
Gore Vidal’s Lincoln. Here are two further illustrations of this familiar infer-
ence process that advocates of so-called “literary humanism” (Gaskin, 
2013) have defended, from reviews of recent film releases, one giving praise 
and another criticism. The first is Christian Caryl’s (2015) criticism of al-
leged inaccuracies in Alan Turing’s biopic The Imitation Game (2014), provid-
ing different respects in which the movie “is a bizarre departure from the 
historical record”. The other comes from a review by Ian Buruma [Russia 
and China: The Movie”, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/authoritarian 
-capitalism-russia-china-by-ian-buruma-2014 11]:  
 
The times we live in are often most clearly reflected in the mirror of art. 
Much has been written about post-communism in Russia and China. But 
two recent films, Jia Zhangke’s A Touch of Sin, made in China in 2013, and 
Andrey Zvyagintsev’s Leviathan, made in Russia in 2014, reveal the social 
and political landscapes of these countries more precisely than anything I 
have seen in print.  
 
As Friend (2014) and Ichino & Currie (forthcoming) make clear, howev-
er, it is not straightforward to develop an epistemology that could lend 
support to such contentions in a sufficiently articulated way. Part of the 
problem has to do with the indirectness with which the constative acts to 
be found in fictions that these claims presuppose are conveyed, about 
which I’ll say more below. There are further epistemological worries, 
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which Friend and Ichino & Currie discuss, relating to an apparent excess 
of credulity to which, some empirical results suggest, readers are prone– 
in particular data from Daniel Gilbert and colleagues that Matravers 
(2014), p. 27, aligns in support of the claim that there is no significant 
difference between our engagement with fictions and with “representa-
tions generally”. Nonetheless, both Friend and Ichino & Currie go on to 
provide reasons to think that learning from fiction is possible. On the 
one hand, they give reasons for taking the results from the relevant ex-
periments with a pinch of salt; as Graham (2010) and Sperber et al. 
(2010) argue, we also have filter mechanisms of “epistemic vigilance” (as 
the latter authors call them) that allow us to be far less credulous on is-
sues that matter to us. On the other, they suggest epistemological stories 
that make the acquisition of knowledge from fiction intelligible. 
Fricker (2012) argues against this, on the basis of the indirectness of 
any constative acts found in what primarily is an act of fiction-making. 
Consider a stock example in recent debates on the semantics/pragmatics 
divide. Peter asks Sally whether John will join them for a dinner Peter is 
about to book, and Sally replies, “John has had dinner”. There is a pri-
mary message here, the assertion that John has had dinner shortly before 
the dialogue, and a secondary message, the assertion that John will not 
want to join them for dinner. According to Fricker, only the primary 
message can be asserted – but not the secondary, insinuated or indirectly 
conveyed one. She offers two reasons. First, a secondary message will be 
too ambiguous for the speaker to fully commit to it. Second, the audi-
ence will have to choose to draw certain inferences and it is thus they, not 
the speaker, who are responsible for the inferences that they choose to 
draw. Other skeptics about learning from fiction have made similar points.  
To assuage doubts like this, Ichino & Currie offer an alternative 
model to explain the acquisition of beliefs from fictions. Readers take the 
way the work is written to indicate something about the author’s serious 
beliefs; they have some confidence in the reliability of those beliefs and 
hence some confidence that the propositions believed are true. Thus, we 
might take the authors of Leviathan and A Touch of Sin to be in a position 
to have the knowledge of their societies given by the films. We might 
take them as creating the films to put us in a position to acquire it, 
through something like the “narrative as clearinghouse” procedure that 
Gendler identifies. And we might respond to the film by accepting the 
corresponding invitations to form beliefs. Similarly, Caryl’s criticism as-
sumes that Turing’s biopic invites inferences of the same sort, and ob-
jects to it based on the falsity of the beliefs thereby formed. The films 
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are primarily fictions. They are thereby primarily subject to norms ac-
cording to which they should present content that interested readers 
might find worthwhile imagining. But this is compatible with their inclu-
sion of straightforward constative acts concerning parts of those con-
tents, subject thereby to truth-related norms. It is even compatible with 
taking their inclusion of such assertions as contributing to their satisfying 
their more specific norm as fictions, given conventionally established ex-
pectations about the genres to which they belong.2  
A detailed epistemic analysis of such inferences would, however, be 
no easy matter. Friend (2014) uses ideas on safety and epistemic compe-
tence from Sosa; in previous work [Friend (2006)] she had invoked an al-
ternative epistemic framework for similar purposes. Graham (2010) 
provides an evolutionary perspective that could also be put to use. How-
ever, the genus of constatives does not only include the species assertion. 
Claims made in a philosophy talk or paper are not flat-out assertions; 
they are not intended to be accepted just by comprehending the force 
and content with which they are presented, plus perhaps the absence of 
reasons to distrust the agent, or the presence of positive reasons to trust 
her, depending on the correct epistemology of testimony [cf. Graham 
(2010)]. Their illocutionary point is instead to make or merely present 
some claims to the audience, calling their attention to considerations in 
their favor. Fictions also include constatives of this kind. This leads us to 
the second of the two ways through which we can learn from fictions I 
mentioned above, which Lewis (1978/83, 278-9) also envisaged:  
 
Fiction can offer us contingent truths about this world. It cannot take the 
place of non-fictional evidence, to be sure. But sometimes evidence is not 
lacking. We who have lived in the world for a while have plenty of evi-
dence, but we may not have learned as much from it as we could have 
done. This evidence bears on a certain proposition. If only that proposi-
tion is formulated, straightway it will be apparent that we have very good 
evidence for it. If not, we will continue not to know it. Here, fiction can 
help us. If we are given a fiction such that the proposition is obviously 
true in it, we are led to ask: and is it also true simpliciter? And sometimes, 
when we have plenty of unappreciated evidence, to ask the question is to 
know the answer. 
 
Gendler (op. cit., p. 76) calls this second inferential process “narrative 
as factory: I export things from the story whose truth becomes apparent 
as a result of thinking about the story itself. These I add to my stock the 
way I add knowledge gained by modeling”. Thus, to illustrate it again 
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with reviews of recently released films, Dan Kois writes in Slate that 
Richard Linklater’s Boyhood is “both a singular work … and a universal 
one, reflecting the elemental formative experiences of nearly every view-
er, even those who don’t … have a lot in common with Mason or Sa-
mantha or Olivia or Mason Sr. It’s … a profound statement about the 
lives we live”.3 Several writers have argued that it is in these acts of put-
ting forward for our consideration (perhaps in ways that can only be fully ap-
preciated through the conscious experiences we can obtain from fully 
worked out narratives) that we find the most significant forms of 
knowledge we can acquire from fiction. For example, Cora Diamond has 
argued that literature provides knowledge by leading us to “attend to the 
world and what is in it, in a way that will involve the exercise of all our 
faculties” [Diamond (1995), p. 296]. In deservedly influential work, Mar-
tha Nussbaum emphasizes how literature enriches our experience and 
understanding of the world: “The point is that in the activity of literary 
imagining we are led to imagine and describe with greater precision, fo-
cusing our attention on each word, feeling each event more keenly” 
[Nussbaum (1990), pp. 47-48]. Literature deepens our knowledge, Nuss-
baum suggests, by making details of the world salient to us. 
We can illustrate this second way in which we can learn from fic-
tion by discussing what appear to be thematic claims made in fictions 
about the very philosophical matter we have been discussing – the pos-
sibility of acquiring knowledge from fiction. Being professionally inter-
ested in the topic, we should expect fictions to convey constatives about 
it. And of course, there are many examples of this kind. In a previous 
paper on this topic [García-Carpintero (2007), pp. 203-4], I quoted in full 
(my own translation of) a short story by Julio Cortázar, “A Continuity of 
Parks”. It features a reader “transported” to what he reasonably takes to 
be a merely fictional story which, unfortunately unbeknownst to him, 
narrates a succession of events in fact simultaneously unfolding while he 
reads, eventually leading to (one infers) his being killed “offscreen” in 
the story’s denouement. As I explain there, it is reasonable to take the 
story to make points about the topic of this essay. Which points? An ob-
vious one is modal:4 there might be fictions whose contents are entirely 
true. This would be a philosophical claim, contradicting some views on 
fiction. Drawing on recent work on the epistemology of modality, Stokes 
(2006) elaborates on how fictions support such modal claims [cfr. also 
Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009)]. The basic idea is that they make situations 
conceivable; under certain assumptions, developed in different ways by 
different philosophers, this supports a claim that what is thus conceiva-
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ble is thereby also possible. Once more, Lewis envisaged this: “Fiction 
might serve as a means for discovery of modal truth … Here the fiction 
serves the same purpose as an example in philosophy … the philosophi-
cal example is just a concise bit of fiction” [Lewis (1978/83), p. 278]. 
A possible model for explaining these inferences is that of indirect 
speech acts [cfr. García-Carpintero (2013) and Reicher (2012)]. Grice 
(1975) offered a deservedly influential analysis for a specific case, conver-
sational implicatures, in which assertions are indirectly conveyed by other 
assertions. The maxims that Grice provided were attuned to that case and 
cannot be generalized. For instance, the maxim of quality (“Try to make 
your contribution one that is true”, op. cit., p. 27) cannot be applied to ex-
plain how assertions are conveyed by questions, or to how assertives are 
conveyed by fictions for that matter, because questions and fictions are 
not constitutively either true or false. But the Cooperative Principle 
(“make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage 
at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk ex-
change” ibid., p. 26), from which Grice derives the specific maxims, 
should be invoked in any general account of indirect speech acts. The 
engagement with a fiction can be taken as a “conversation”, a coopera-
tive undertaking involving authors and their expected audiences; one in 
which the partners know little of each other, but this just contributes to 
delineating how the cooperative principle can reasonably apply.5 Also, as 
in the previous case of facts exported from fictions, genre conventions 
and related assumptions will be relevant. We assume that, even though 
the utterly unexpected denouement for such a short story already makes 
it sufficiently gratifying, it is common for serious literary authors such as 
Cortázar to use their fictions to make claims like the one I ventured to 
articulate above. 
The two ways of conveying constatives I have discussed rely on 
hermeneutical processes. Because of this, they create more indetermina-
tion than that which already afflicts those directly conveyed by uttering 
sentences in the declarative mood in default contexts, using expressions 
in their straightforward literal way.6 As the debate on the seman-
tics/pragmatics divide in the past three decades has shown, and as I have 
illustrated above, this already requires a share of hermeneutics and hence 
creates a good measure of indetermination. I was tentative in stating the 
philosophical point of Cortázar’s story, and that was a relatively easy case 
because it is so short that it can be taken as a philosophical thought ex-
periment – but a thought experiment intended to support exactly which 
philosophical view? It would not do for me to enlist Cortázar in support 
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of my own views. From what we know about him, in all probability the 
thought experiment was meant to support an altogether opposite view 
about the nature of fiction. Namely, one close to Goodman’s (1976), ac-
cording to which there is no constitutive difference between fiction and 
non-fiction, only one of degree relative to the number of truths – i.e., 
(for him) propositions counted as true by some contextually trusted epis-
temology. So Cortázar would not have put the point of the story as I did 
two paragraphs back, but perhaps rather like this: there might be works 
we take to be fictions that are not in fact fictions. 
This is also the main point of Marías’s Dark Back of Time. Here the 
more essayistic form of the fiction makes it easier to identify it. He de-
clares right at the beginning:  
 
I believe I’ve still never mistaken fiction for reality, though I have mixed 
them together more than once, as everyone does, not only novelists or 
writers but everyone who has recounted anything since the time we know 
began … words – even when spoken, even at their crudest – are in and of 
themselves metaphorical and therefore imprecise, and cannot be imagined 
without ornament, though it is often involuntary; there is ornament in 
even the most arid exposition and frequently in interjections and insults as 
well. All anyone has to do is introduce an “as if” into the story, or not 
even that, all you need to do is use a simile, comparison or figure of 
speech … and fiction creeps into the narration of what happened, altering 
or falsifying it. The time-honored aspiration of any chronicler or survivor– 
to tell what happened, give an account of what took place, leave a record 
of events and crimes and exploits – is, in fact, a mere illusion or chimera, 
or, rather, the phrase and concept themselves are already metaphorical and 
partake of fiction. “To tell what happened” is inconceivable and futile, or 
possible only as invention. The idea of testimony is also futile and there 
has never been a witness who could truly fulfill his duty. … Yet in these 
pages I’m going to place myself on the side of those who have sometimes 
claimed to be telling what really happened or pretended to succeed in do-
ing so, I’m going to tell what happened, or was ascertained, or simply 
known—what happened in my experience or in my fabulation or to my 
knowledge [op. cit., pp. 7-9].  
 
Here Marías seems to understand ‘fiction’ in the sense of falsehood, and 
uses familiar arguments to make his point; one of them is just the obser-
vation by Friend (2008), that non-fictions include contents presented to 
be imagined and not to be believed. This would also explain the reasons 
he provides throughout the book to mock those whom he takes to mis-
take fiction for reality. The book discusses the reception of his earlier 
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novel, All Souls. He questions people who (reasonably, in my view), tak-
ing the book to be a sort of roman à clef or autobiographical novel, make 
“narrative as clearinghouse” inferences of the kind we have examined 
above. His argument against these inferences appears to be that they are 
wrong in some cases, and this does not detract from the value of the 
work: his nameless narrator has properties that he himself does not have, 
for instance. His point is well taken – this is one of the main reasons I 
mentioned above why the epistemology of learning from fiction is tricky. 
As also indicated above, non-skeptics deal with this by contending that 
learning from testimony in general does create similar challenges; Friend 
(2014) and Ichino & Currie (forthcoming) argue that exercising adequate 
vigilance suffices to make the beliefs we acquire from fictions justified 
enough to count as knowledge. 
Another fiction, Ian McEwan’s Atonement, also appears to repro-
duce considerations against learning from fiction that can be found in the 
philosophical literature. The book concerns the difficulties that Briony – a 
novelist – has writing a novel that she intends as atonement for a huge 
mistake she made in her adolescence:  
 
The problem these fifty-nine years has been this: how can a novelist 
achieve atonement when, with her absolute power of deciding outcomes, 
she is also God? There is no one, no entity or higher form that she can 
appeal to, or be reconciled with, or that can forgive her. There is nothing 
outside her. In her imagination she has set the limits and the terms. No 
atonement for God, or novelists, even if they are atheists [McEwan 
(2001), pp. 350-1].  
 
As I interpret it, McEwan is here both assuming and putting forward 
(using the “narrative as factory” procedure) the sort of “postmodernist” 
view of Riffaterre (1990) and others, on which fictions cannot make ref-
erence to the actual world. This is the alleged reason why Briony cannot 
ask for forgiveness: the forgiveness she needs must come from someone 
outside her, while her fiction only refers to entities of her own made. On 
this basis, McEwan suggests that learning from fictions, as much as aton-
ing by means of them, is just impossible. 
Yasunari Kawabata’s novel Beauty and Sadness (1964) presents the al-
ternative, non-skeptical point of view. For a main theme of the novel is 
how artists (a novelist and a painter) can try to cope with a tragic event 
in their lives (the sadness in the title) by dealing with it in their respective 
artworks (the beauty); and the novel straightforwardly assume that people 
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can justifiably obtain information about reality (about the tragic events, 
and the attitudes towards them of their agents) by engaging with the fic-
tions. (What they do with that information is another matter; according 
to the novel – and this is the second main thematic point – it depends in 
part on their own temporal perspective regarding the events in the past.) 
So far I have provided some elements of the philosophical conver-
sation about learning from fiction in contemporary discussions, and in 
passing what I take to be some significant references; I have also sug-
gested that that conversation is reflected in thematic claims we can find 
in fictional works themselves – whether justifiably or unjustifiably, de-
pending on whether it is the skeptics or the optimists that are right about 
this topic. I will now wrap up by summarizing the main points made in 
the papers that we have selected for the volume. 
MARÍA JOSÉ ALCARAZ doesn’t question the optimist view that we 
can learn from fictions, but she objects to a stronger claim that is some-
times made, namely, that fictions provide a unique kind of knowledge. 
Her main point is that we should be cautious in deriving from the fact 
that fictions can afford knowledge the conclusion that this is a form of 
knowledge available only through fictions. If it were, it could not be 
available through a similar but non-fictional representation. She exam-
ines the features upon which the cognitive value of fictions relies (in par-
ticular, the emotions that fictions are very good at arousing) and she 
argues that they are not exclusive to fictional works: non-fictional ones 
possess them too. 
GREG CURRIE’S contribution is also mildly in the skeptical camp. 
Plato banished the artists because of their potential danger: they can cer-
tainly promote empathy, but this is mostly put to morally and rationally 
dubious purposes. In Plato’s wake, Iris Murdoch – who valued the 
strengths of fiction, in contrast to other forms such as the philosophical 
article or the history book, in that good fictions focus our attention on 
the points they convey in a unique way – was sensitive to it: “A great 
deal of art, perhaps most art, actually is self-consoling fantasy, and even 
great art cannot guarantee the quality of its consumer's consciousness” 
[Murdoch (1997), p. 370]. Nonetheless, she ends up emphasizing the vir-
tues: “Art is a special discerning exercise of intelligence in relation to the 
real; and although aesthetic form has essential elements of trickery and 
magic, yet form in art, as form in philosophy, is designed to communi-
cate and reveal” [ibid., p. 454]. In his contribution, Currie examines what 
we can learn on these issues from current empirical research. He makes 
two claims: (i) It is one thing to show that literature makes us more em-
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pathic, and another to show that it makes us more usefully discriminating 
empathizers. (ii) A serious study of the effects of literature on empathy 
should investigate possible ways in which literature might compromise 
our empathic tendencies and not focus exclusively on good news stories. 
According to current orthodoxy, fictions are some sort of proposal 
to imagine, a point that KATHLEEN STOCK’S paper, summarized mo-
mentarily, nicely develops; hence, if it is possible to acquire knowledge 
from them – along previously suggested lines, or those that Stock herself 
suggests – there must be an epistemological story regarding how imagin-
ings can be epistemic grounds for beliefs. FABIAN DORSCH’S paper con-
fronts precisely this issue, and provides a detailed account supporting an 
argument that this can indeed be the case. 
In her contribution Kathleen Stock assumes a fairly standard view 
of the nature of fiction, on which fictions are Gricean speech acts in-
tended to produce imaginings in their audience. She critically discusses 
views on the determination of the contents of fictions, i.e., what is “fic-
tionally true” in them. On some views (“actual intentionalism”), this is 
determined by the actual intentions of the fiction-maker – so that evi-
dence from, say, a secret diary unavailable to the ordinary reader is per-
fectly adequate to establish the fiction’s content. On alternative views 
(“hypothetical intentionalism”, “value-maximizing” theory) such hidden 
actual intentions are irrelevant; only interpretations based on evidence 
available to the ordinary well-informed reader of the produced text are 
acceptable.  
Stock assumes that learning contingent truths about the world from 
fiction, in the way we acquire knowledge through testimony, is possible; 
she shows how actual intentionalism is consistent with this. She then po-
ses a dilemma to anti-intentionalist theories. They could try to offer a 
model for the transmission of beliefs through fictions analogous to those 
they provide for the determination of the content of fictions; but this 
seems to conflict with the fact that the justification of beliefs acquired 
via testimony, on any proposed model for this, appears to be sensitive to 
the justification of the beliefs of the actual originator. The other horn has 
the anti-intentionalist accepting that the content of beliefs transmitted 
through testimony by fictions depends on the beliefs of the actual fic-
tion-maker; but then they have further work to do to explain the discon-
nection between the strategies they defend for the interpretation of 
fictional contents to be imagined, and those to be believed. 
TERRONE’S, ŽANIĆ’S and BOARDMAN’S papers nicely complement 
each other. Terrone suggests that we could take his proposal as a form of 
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a “neo-cognitivist” view on learning from fiction. John Gibson (2008) 
and Jukka Mikkonen (2015) have described as “neo-cognitivist” the ap-
proaches that treat the cognitive value of fiction in terms of “understan-
ding” rather than in terms of warranted beliefs. This corresponds rather 
well to Gendler’s “narrative as factory” paradigm, of fictions as models. 
Mikkonen mentions the related work of Catherine Z. Elgin (1993) and 
Eileen John (1998) as precedents. In this framework, Terrone develops a 
suggestion made by Ichino & Currie (forthcoming), that what one learns 
from fictions can be essentially indexical: jealousy can be like this, with the 
demonstrative pointing towards characters and events in Proust’s In 
Search of Lost Time.  
Žanić, for his part, develops in (neo-)cognitivist ways claims origi-
nally made on behalf of anti-cognitivism by Peter Lamarque (2006), con-
cerning the role of thematic statements in appreciating fictions – this could 
be nicely applied to the examples I have provided, of fictions whose 
themes concern precisely the topic of this volume. In the final part of his 
just mentioned paper, Terrone discusses the “dilemma of paraphrase”: 
On the one hand, the putative knowledge acquired from fictions can be 
paraphrased in independent terms, and thereby vindicated as proposi-
tional knowledge in good standing; but the paraphrases that readily come 
to mind turn out to be trivial propositions that we do not need to be 
told, by fiction or non-fiction [Stolnitz (1992)]. On the other hand, the 
putative knowledge cannot be paraphrased; but then the claim that it is 
knowledge becomes suspicious. Terrone provides paraphrases using his 
main claim, on the one hand explaining why the dilemma has some cu-
rrency, and on the other dismissing it. Now, the most general way he 
suggests for such paraphrases is an existential claim: “in the actual world, 
something is like this”, with the demonstrative pointing to some property 
exemplified [in Goodman’s (1976), pp. 52-6, sense] by some fictional char-
acter of situation. Žanić, however, gives some reasons for rejecting these 
existential paraphrases (for one thing, they are still too trivial sounding), 
and in favor of constructing the claims that articulate the sort of “under-
standing” provided by fictions as generics (such as lions are wild, which are 
compatible with exceptions, even with most of the Fs lacking the ascribed 
quality G). In fact, when Terrone provides a more concrete example of the 
sort of claim he has in mind, about Robert Bresson’s film Au hazard Balt-
hazar, he gives us a generic: “life is like this, life is Balthazaresque”.  
Also in defense of cognitivism, BOARDMAN – perhaps unwittingly – 
illustrates the triviality horn of the dilemma, when he claims: “We might 
learn from The Great Gatsby, for instance, that obsession with status can 
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be mistaken for romantic obsession, and that we are capable of doing 
awful things to ourselves and others when in the grip of such obses-
sions”. This is meant to illustrate one of the two ways in which we can 
learn from fictions, basically the Aristotelian model on which characters 
encode sufficiently realistic and detailed characters, and the events that 
befall them fittingly unfold from them. Boardman’s view could thus per-
haps also benefit from Terrone’s proposal, by replying to the skeptics 
that what we learn from Gatsby is in fact more substantive: that obsession 
with status can be mistaken like this for romantic obsession, and that we 
are capable of doing awful things like this to ourselves and others when in 
the grip of such obsessions. Boardman also develops in interesting detail, 
and illustrates with nice examples, a second traditional model for learn-
ing from fiction, on which they, like thought-experiments, provide ar-
guments for modal claims.  
The final three papers discuss issues not so directly in the main-
stream current debate about learning from fiction, but clearly related to 
it. ROSENBAUM discusses the puzzles of imaginative resistance in rela-
tion to learning from fiction. As the discussion over the years has made 
clear, and Rosenbaum helpfully summarizes, “imaginative resistance” in 
fact covers a plurality of phenomena. The two he discusses are the alethic 
puzzle – the resistance to taking a content we are proposed to imagine in 
a fiction as true in the fiction – and the phenomenological puzzle – the jarring 
impression we get in noticing that we are being asked to imagine some 
contents in exposing ourselves to a fiction. Rosenbaum critically discus-
ses Gendler’s influential account, on which the puzzles are explained by 
our resistance to export from fictions claims we take to be false in the 
actual world, and he opts for Weatherson’s account, which appeals to an 
“in virtue of” principle, on which the explanation has rather to do with 
the resistance to accepting higher-order contents in tension with the lo-
wer-order contents that should ground them. He argues that this account 
makes it difficult to understand how we can learn from fictions moral 
claims that we do not accept, and advances a more complex account in-
volving several factors. 
It is for the reader to appraise the conflict between the considera-
tions Boardman provides for this, and DOHRN’S rather skeptical discus-
sion of related points. Thought experiments as used in philosophy and 
science are said to provide a clear case establishing how we can learn 
from fictions. Dohrn critically discusses an argument by Ichikawa and 
Jarvis (2009) that the role of thought experiments in philosophy requires 
us to interpret them in the same way as we interpret fictions. He argues 
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that everyday fictions could be interpreted through mechanisms not spe-
cially addressed at them; taken in that way, thought experiments do not 
establish any special or significant epistemic role for fiction. Alternative-
ly, fictions do involve sui generis procedures; he considers psychological 
“transportation” (high emotional involvement, cf. Currie’s contribution), 
and a particular way of admitting conceptual incoherence. But those cas-
es appear to be detrimental for the epistemic significance of fictions, he 
points out. 
Finally, POZNIC examines a more specific discussion, nonetheless 
directly related to the general one we have rehearsed: whether proposals 
such as those by Roman Frigg and Adam Toon, who argue that the 
models invoked in scientific theorizing should be regarded as fictions, al-
low scientific knowledge to be obtained from these models about the ac-
tual systems modeled. Frigg’s and Toon’s view is that scientists are 
participating in games of make-believe when they study models, in order 
to learn about the models themselves and about the target systems repre-
sented by the models. Poznic critically discusses the epistemology of 
these fictionalist views. He accepts that both views can give an explana-
tion of how scientists learn about the models they are studying. Howev-
er, he defends a critical view regarding the main issue, arguing that how 
the use of models allows for knowledge about target systems is not suffi-
ciently accounted for in such views. 
In preparing this volume, I have had the invaluable help of the ex-
tremely useful blind referees’ reports (two for each of the submitted pa-
pers) provided by some of the most influential philosophers working in 
this field. I am immensely grateful to them, as, I am sure, are the authors 
who received the anonymized reports, including those whose papers we 
unfortunately had to reject. The reviewers’ names will appear in the list 
the journal publishes every other year of referees who have reviewed pa-
pers over this period. 
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NOTES 
 
1 There are many nuances that I will be disregarding for my purposes here. 
For instance, learning does not need to involve coming to believe new truths, 
but merely coming to be closer to the truth. (Cf. Ichino and Currie (forthcom-
ing) for a helpful discussion). 
2 Cf. Gaut (2006), p. 120, on imaginative projects whose goal is “to learn 
about the world”. 
3 Dan Kois, “The Academy’s Failure to Recognize Boyhood Is Their Worst 
Mistake in 20 Years”, The Slate 23/02/2015.  
4 I.e., one about what is possible or necessary. 
5 Cf, Dixon and Bortolussi (2001) for considerations against this, and 
Gerrig and Horton (2001) for a good rejoinder. 
6 Cf. Buchanan (2013) for a good discussion of the relevant indeterminacy, 
its consequences, and ways of understanding it. 
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